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Did Congress Limit the Appellate Court's
Discretion to Stay an Alien's Removal
from the United States Pending Appeal?
by JessicaE. Slavin
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PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 266-271. 0 2009 American Bar Association,

Jessica E. Slavin is an assistant
professor of legal writing at
Marquette University Law School
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In
addition to legal writing and
appellate advocacy, she teaches
a seminar in refugee law.
She can be reached at
jessica.slavin@marquette.edu
or (414) 288-7486.

A Cameroonian
asylum seeker sought
reconsideration of his case
based upon new evidence.
Reconsideration was
denied, and he was
ordered removed but
sought a stay of removal
pending appeal. The
Fourth Circuit denied
the stay, having recently
held that 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(0(2) bars such
stays unless clear and
convincing evidence
demonstrates that
removal would violate
law. This heightened
standard governs aliens'
motions to stay removal
in the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, while
eight other circuits judge
such motions under the
ordinary balancing test for
preliminary injunctions.
The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to
resolve the circuit split.
/
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Editor's note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not available by
PREVIEWs deadline.
ISSUE
Which standard governs a court of
appeals' decision whether to stay an
alien's removal from the United
States pending consideration of the
alien's petition for review: the traditional test for stays and preliminary
injunctive relief, or the heightened
standard from 8 U.S.C. § 1252(0(2),
which provides that "no court shall
enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order ... Unless the
alien shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the entry or execution
[of the removal order] is prohibited
as a matter of law"?
FACTS
Petitioner Jean Marc Nken is a citizen of Cameroon who entered the
United States lawfully in April 2001
and applied for asylum and withholding of removal eight months
later. An immigration judge initially
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denied Nken's applications for asylum and withholding of removal in
April 2003. Following a complicated
series of petitions, appeals, and
motions to reopen, the case was
presented to the Supreme Court in
November 2008. In the Supreme
Court, Nken seeks review of the
Fourth Circuit's denial of his motion
to stay a final order for his removal
while his appeal is pending.
Nken sought the stay pending
appeal after the Board of
Immigration Appeals (the BIA)
denied his motion to reopen the
asylum case based upon recent
changed country conditions in
Cameroon. The Supreme Court has
granted Nken's application for a
temporary stay, treating it as a petition for writ of certiorari in order to
decide a single question: "Whether
the decision of a court of appeals to
stay an alien's removal pending consideration of the alien's petition for
review is governed by the standard
set forth in § 242(0(2) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2), or instead by
the traditional tests for stays and
preliminary injunctive relief."
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Nken initially entered the United
States on a transit visa, which
authorized him to stay here for
about a week. He overstayed the
visa and sought asylum in
December 2001. In his asylum
application, Nken stated that as a
university student in Cameroon he
was arrested, interrogated, and beaten because of his participation in
anti-government activities.
Specifically, he stated that he was
first arrested in Cameroon in 1990
because of his involvement in a
protest march. He was detained for
approximately one month, during
which time he was beaten and interrogated. After his release, he went
to live with his brother and later
with his parents. His father assisted
him in fleeing Cameroon for the
Ivory Coast, where he lived for ten
years as a student, becoming a
member and later an officer in an
organization of Cameroonian students in the Ivory Coast. With this
new student organization, he participated in three demonstrations at
the Cameroonian Embassy.
After a coup d'etat in the Ivory
Coast in December 2000, Nken
stated, he decided to return to
Cameroon but was arrested upon
arrival, detained for about one
month, and again beaten and interrogated. Nken stated that he was
released because his father bribed
government officials and that he
then fled to the Bahamas and eventually to the United States, seeking
medical care in Cameroon before he
fled.
After the April 2003 hearing at
which Nken testified regarding these
matters, the immigration judge (the
IJ) denied Nken's application. The IJ
raised several questions regarding
Nken's testimony and application
materials, including the precise
nature of Nken's political involvement in Cameroon, the route by
which he traveled to first his broth-

er's home and then his father's
home after his release from prison,
and how he traveled when injured
by the alleged beatings. For these
and other reasons, the IJ concluded
that Nken "failed to meet his burden in establishing past persecution,
or that he has a well-founded fear of
future persecution."
Nken appealed and in August 2004,
the BIA remanded the case, because
although the IJ seemed to doubt
Nken's credibility, the IJ failed to
make any specific credibility determination. On remand, after review
of the file and the prior decision,
the IJ in March 2005 issued a new
oral decision that included an
express adverse credibility finding,
based upon "inconsistencies, difficulties with the documents, and
improbabilities."
Nken again appealed. Also, having
married a U.S. citizen, Nken accompanied this appeal with a motion to
remand to pursue his wife's pending
petition for a permanent resident
visa on his behalf. In June 2006,
after rejecting Nken's motion to file
an untimely appellate brief, the BIA
affirmed the immigration judge's
new decision, concluding there was
"no clear error" in the adverse credibility determination. The BIA furthermore denied the motion to
remand, because Nken's wife's petition for his permanent resident visa
was only pending, not approved.
Nken moved the BIA to reopen and
reconsider, but in September 2006,
the BIA denied the motion under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2, which provides that
an alien, generally speaking, may
file only one motion to reopen.
Nken sought review in the Fourth
Circuit, and in an unpublished decision in April 2007, the Fourth
Circuit denied the petition, deciding
that the adverse credibility finding,
the finding of ineligibility for asylum, the denial of leave to file a late

brief, and the denial of remand all
were justified. Nken filed a second
motion to reopen before the BIA in
December 2006, but the BIA again
rejected the motion, and the Fourth
Circuit, in April 2008, again
affirmed.
Finally, in May 2008, Nken filed his
third motion to reopen the removal
proceedings, this time based upon
changed country conditions in
Cameroon, namely, unrest following
the president's move to remove
presidential term limits from the
constitution in early 2008; and new
evidence, including a letter from
Nken's brother describing the recent
unrest, the brother's arrest by government forces, and Nken's alleged
inclusion on a list of 1990s-era antigovernment protesters wanted by
the government. The BIA denied the
motion in June 2008, finding that
Nken failed to sufficiently demonstrate changed country conditions
because he "failed to submit his
own statement or asylum application articulating his persecution
claim based on recent reports of civil unrest," particularly in view of the
IJ's prior adverse credibility finding.
Furthermore, the BIA reasoned,
"tragic or widespread savage violence resulting from civil war" is no
basis for asylum.
In the same decision, the BIA
declined to sua sponte (on its own
motion) reopen the proceedings to
permit Nken to adjust his status to
that of permanent resident based
upon his wife's now-approved visa
petition. The fact that Nken and his
wife were now parents of a U.S. citizen child was not the sort of
"exceptional circumstances" to support sua sponte reopening of the
proceedings.
Thereafter, Nken sought review in
the Fourth Circuit and a stay of
removal pending appeal. On the
merits, Nken argued that in its hold(Continued on Page 268)
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ing that the new evidence did not
link the generalized strife in
Cameroon with Nken personally, the
BIA apparently had disregarded the
brother's statements in the letter
that Nken's name appears on a list
of known anti-government activists.
On the merits, the government
responded that Nken was misreading the BIAs decision. With regard
to the stay, the government cited
the Fourth Circuit's recent holding
in Teshome-Gebreegziabherv.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 330 (4th Cir.
2008), that § 1252(0(2) applies to
an alien's motion to stay removal
and objected that Nken could not
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the BIAs order of
removal was prohibited as a matter
of law.
In a one-sentence decision, the
Fourth Circuit denied the motion
for a stay. Nken filed a motion in
the Supreme Court seeking an
emergency stay pending resolution
of the appeal in the Fourth Circuit,
or in the alternative, asking that the
motion be treated as a petition for
certiorari. The Court treated the
motion as a petition for certiorari,
and granted the petition, limited to
the question of which standard
properly governs an alien's motion
for a stay of removal pending
appeal.
CASE ANALYSIS
Before the passage of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA),
a stay of removal (which was called
"deportation" in the pre-1996 code)
was usually automatic when an
alien filed a petition for review. In
the few cases in which the stay was
not automatic, the courts applied
the traditional balancing test for
issuance of stays, generally considering four factors: the alien's likelihood of success on the merits of the
petition, the possibility of irreparable harm to the alien, the potential

harm to other parties through
issuance of the stay, and the public
interest.
As the petitioner's brief notes, three
of IIRIRA's amendments are relevant
to the question presented here.
First, in IIRIRA, Congress eliminated the automatic stay of removal
pending review, providing instead
that "the petition ... does not stay
the removal of an alien pending the
court's decision on the petition,
unless the court orders otherwise."
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3(B). That provision specified no standard for the
court's consideration of a stay.
Second, Congress eliminated the
jurisdictional bars that previously
had prevented aliens from pursuing
petitions for review after removal.
See 110 Stat. 3009-612 (repealing 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1994)). Third,
Congress created a new provision,
in a separate subsection titled
"Limits on Injunctive Relief," codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1252. This new
provision limited the availability of
classwide injunctive relief in challenges to the new procedural framework established by IIRIRA, and
also limited injunctive relief in
"[piarticular cases" as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin
the removal of any alien pursuant
to a final order under this section
unless the alien shows by clear
and convincing evidence that the
entry or execution of such order
is prohibited as a matter of law.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2).
Thus, the question for the Court to
decide is whether the word enjoin
in § 1252(0(2) encompasses an
appellate court's decision to stay an
alien's removal pending appeal.
Eight circuits have continued
to apply the traditional test for preliminary injunctions to motions
to stay removal pending appeal.
Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d

268

169 (5th Cir. 2005); Hor v.
Gonzales, 400 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2005); Douglas v. Ashcroft, 374
F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2004); Arevalo v.
Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003);
Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95
(2d Cir. 2002); Beijani v. I.N.S., 271
F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2001), abrogated
on other grounds by FernandezVargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30
(2006); Andreiu v. Ashcroft, 253
F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2001) (en bane);
Lim v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1011
(10th Cir. 2004).
In contrast, two circuits, first the
Eleventh Circuit and now the
Fourth Circuit, have held that
§ 1252(0(2) applies to an alien's
motion for a stay pending appeal
and that, therefore, such a stay
may not issue without "clear and
convincing evidence that the
[removal order's entry or execution]
is prohibited as a matter of law."
Teshome-Gebreegziabherv.
Mukasey, 528 F.3d 330 (4th Cir.
2008), reh'g en bane denied, 545
F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2008); Weng v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 287 F.3d 1335 (11th
Cir. 2002).
The petitioner's argument opens
with the observation that "[tlhe
power to grant a stay is one of the
federal courts' traditional equitable
powers. Indeed, it is 'a power as old
as the judicial system of the
nation."' The petitioner suggests
that a clear statement from
Congress is required to evidence
congressional intent to deprive the
appellate courts of the power to stay
the litigation pending appeal. See
Scripps-HowardRadio v. F.C.C.,
316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942). "Against that
backdrop," the petitioner argues, it
is incorrect to interpret the word
enjoin in § 1252(0(2) to refer to
temporary stays pending appeal.
The petitioner acknowledges that
the word injunction includes "[in a
general sense, every order of a court

Issue No. 4 Volume 36

which commands or forbids," see
Black's Law Dictionary800 (8th ed.
2004), but emphasizes that at the
same time, the law has consistently
recognized a more precise meaning
of the words injunction and enjoin,
referring to orders controlling a
party's conduct, distinct from the
term stay, referring to orders that
temporarily deprive another
court's legal order of effect. Thus
"[blecause a stay temporarily stops
the legal effect of an order, whereas
an injunction controls the conduct
of a party, a court may stay an
injunction, [citation omitted], but a
court does not 'enjoin' a stay." A
similar observation was made by
Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh
Circuit's opinion holding that §
1252(f)(2) does not apply to
motions for stays:
The Attorney General wants us to
treat "stays" as a subset of
"injunctions." Certainly there is a
functional overlap: a stay, like an
injunction, can stop an agency in
its tracks. ... But the words
nonetheless cover different
domains. An "injunction" is an
order issued as the relief in independent litigation, while a "stay"
is an order integral to a system of
judicial review. ... Perhaps the
distinction ...
rests more on history than on function-especially
when the stay's addressee is an
agency rather than another
judge. Still, it is a long-standing
distinction [reflected in the
United States Code and Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure].
Hor, 400 F.3d at 484.
The petitioner, furthermore, contends that "[tIhis distinction
between a stay and an injunction is
a matter of substance, not merely
semantics," noting that distinct
rules of procedure apply to injunctions and stays.
Thus, the petitioner's chief argument is that, in view of the signifiAmerican Bar Association

cant distinction between stays and
injunctions, § 1252(f)(2) does not
apply when a court orders a stay of
removal pending appeal, because it
only applies to orders to "enjoin"
and does not mention orders to
stay. See Hor, 400 F.3d at 484-85
and Tesfamichael, 411 F.3d at 17374. The petitioner bolsters this
basic textual argument with related
arguments based upon canons of
statutory construction, the structure
of the statutory section, and the legislative history.
In addition to textual arguments,
the petitioner supports his interpretation by reference to the practical
effects of the government's interpretation. To begin with, if the heightened standard applies to motions to
stay removal, "in many instances ...
courts [would be required] to apply
a more stringent standard" to the
motion to stay than would have
applied to the appeal on the merits.
Even in cases in which the petitioner had a great likelihood of success
on the merits, the stay would have
to be denied unless "clear and convincing evidence" established the
petitioner's right to remain in the
United States as a matter of law.
This state of affairs is particularly
troublesome in cases like the petitioner's, in which the alien's underlying petition asserts the alien's risk of
detention, beating, and even execution upon removal. The government
surely will point out that under the
IIRIRA scheme, there is no longer
any jurisdictional bar to continuing
review of an alien's petition after the
alien's removal from the United
States. If the petitioner faces persecution upon removal, however, the
fact that review of his case may continue after removal is of little help.
The prospect that a bona fide refugee
could be removed and harmed before
resolution of his petition for review
has been a factor in some circuit
court opinions rejecting the govern-

ment's interpretation of the statute.
E.g., Hor, 400 F.3d at 485 ("The ability to come back to the United States
would not be worth much if the alien
has been maimed or murdered in the
interim.")
One of the amicus briefs supporting
the petitioner points out that the
risk of irreparable harm to the alien
would be irrelevant under the
government's interpretation of
§ 1252(0(2), and would make stays
unavailable to petitioners raising
issues of first impression, close legal
questions, or inadequate consideration of the evidence. Indeed, another amicus brief, filed by a group of
law professors, argues that under
the government's interpretation,
§ 1252(0(2) might violate the
Suspension Clause of the United
States Constitution, because the
Suspension Clause requires some
judicial review of removal orders,
and such severe limits upon the
availability of a stay of removal
pending review of the alien's appeal
would interfere with courts' ability
to grant effective relief.
At the time of this writing, the government's brief on the merits had
not been filed. However, its likely
arguments were previewed in its
response to the petitioner's emergency motion for a stay. In that
brief, the government first argued
that the term enjoin encompasses
the stay sought by the petitioner,
because "[iun its customary usage,
...an injunction 'command[s] or
prevent[s] an action,"' quoting
Black's Law Dictionary.Moreover,
the government contested the petitioner's characterization of a stay of
removal as a customary sort of
"stay" of a court's own decisions or
of the order of an inferior court,
because "[djeportation orders are
self-executing orders, not dependent
upon judicial enforcement." Thus,
the government has argued, because
a stay of removal "prevents an
(Continued on Page 270)

Executive Branch agency from taking an action that would be entirely
lawful [otherwise] ....
[t]he most
natural label for such an order is an
injunction."
The government has refuted the
petitioner's arguments based on the
structure of the code, by observing
that if § 1252(f)(2) does not apply
to the petitioner's motion for a stay,
"it is unclear when ...[that provision] would ever apply," quoting
Teshome-Gebreegziabher,528 F.3d
at 334.
As to the practical impact of interpreting § 1252(f)(2) to apply to the
petitioner's motion for a stay, the
government has emphasized that
"one of Congress's primary purposes
in enacting IIRIRA in 1996 was to
ensure the prompt removal of illegal
aliens from the United States," in
part by eliminating the automatic
stay. Thus, again quoting the Fourth
Circuit, the government has contended that "[mlany of [the petitioner's] arguments 'are not really
arguments' against the government's interpretation of the statute,
"but are more accurately characterized as arguments against any standard other than an automatic stay."
In its opposition to the emergency
motion and the petition for a writ of
certiorari, the government also contended that the petitioner's motion
fails even under the more lenient
traditional standard.
SIGNIFICANCE
The case's significance was well
summarized by Justice Kennedy in
an opinion in chambers in another
case, quoted in the petitioner's
emergency motion:
The issue is important. If the
exacting standard of § 1252(f)(2)
applies to requests for temporary
stays, then to obtain judicial
review aliens subject to removal
must do more than show a likeli-

hood of success on the merits.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.
S. 418, 425 (1979) (The "intermediate standard of clear and
convincing evidence" lies
"between a preponderance of the
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt"). An opportunity
to present one's meritorious
grievances to a court supports the
legitimacy and public acceptance
of a statutory regime. It is particularly so in the immigration context, where seekers of asylum and
refugees from persecution expect
to be treated in accordance with
the rule-of-law principles often
absent in the countries they have
escaped. A standard that is excessively stringent may impede
access to the courts in meritorious cases. On the other hand,
§ 1252(f)(2) is a part of
Congress's deliberate effort to
reform the immigration law in
order to relieve the courts from
the need to consider meritless
petitions and so devote their
scarce judicial resources to meritorious claims for relief. Cf. Reno
v. American-Arab AntiDiscriminationComm., 525
U. S. 471, 486 (1999). If the
interpretation adopted by the
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
is erroneous, and § 1252(f)(2)
governs requests for stays, this
congressional effort will be frustrated. As of this point, applicant
already has overstayed his visa
by more than five years. Had the
Eleventh Circuit granted the stay
under the more lenient approach,
months more would elapse before
his case is resolved.

questions about his safety should he
be returned to Cameroon. At the
same time, after arriving on a transit visa, Nken has remained in the
United States for more than eight
years and already has sought, and
received, many rounds of agency
and judicial review. The government
is sure to emphasize its interest in
efficient resolution of alien's challenges to removal orders, in part
because of the human problems created when an alien lives here during
long-pending proceedings, even, as
here, marrying a citizen and having
a citizen child.
The petitioner's ready response is
that review also must be effective,
particularly in cases involving
claims that removal threatens the
alien's life and bodily integrity. The
government's position is weakened
by the common perception, detailed
in one of the amicus briefs, that
agency review of alien appeals in
the current system is arbitrary and
unreliable. For instance, in a 2005
decision, "Judge Posner [I observed
that the Seventh Circuit had
'reversed the Board of Immigration
Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40 percent of the 136 petitions to review ... on the merits.'"
ATTORNEYS FOR THE
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For Petitioner Jean Marc Nken
(Lindsay C. Harrison (202) 6396865)
For Respondent Michael B.
Mukasey (Gregory G. Garre,
Solicitor General (202) 514-2217)

Kenyeres v. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. 1301,
1305 (Kennedy, J., in chambers).
The competing considerations
detailed by Justice Kennedy in
Kenyeres are at least as well presented in Nken's case. His asylum
application and his recent motion to
reopen, if credible, raise serious
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